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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
INFORMATION REPORT

## REPORT

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SUPPLEMENT TO  
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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION FOR THE RESEARCH  
USE OF TRAINED INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS

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1. The leaders of the SED view with anxiety the future political development in the Russian Zone. The SMA has shown its displeasure at the lack of success of the SED's efforts to make itself a truly popular party, and for months has been pointing out to the SED leaders that the party is steadily losing ground in spite of all the help which they are giving it.
2. The Russians have been told that the issue of the Oder-Neisse Line was the main cause of the SED propaganda failure, but have countered this by saying that this question of the Eastern frontier would only become an acute one for them when the SED and KPD became so strong in Germany that a settlement of this problem in Germany's favor could be guaranteed to procure for these parties a dominating majority all over the country. Until then the parties must gain ground among the population by other means.
3. Colonel Tulpanov, of the SMA, recently ordered Wilhelm Pieck to announce at an SED meeting in Wedding that the Nationaldemokratische Partei (NDP) was the future party for the small ex-Nazi. Pieck had been most unwilling to make this announcement but had been ordered to do so nevertheless. Others of the SED leaders, however, had been of the opinion that it might prove a good idea, as the storm which would be raised in the western-licensed press would surely show the Russians that the policy of backing the NDP was unwise.
4. [redacted] strict instructions had been received from Moscow regarding the announcement of the NDP and [redacted] these instructions must be obeyed [redacted] the official formation of this party might possibly be made a long drawn-out affair, so that if in the meantime the SED could show some outstanding political successes it might even be possible to stop the formation of the NDP.
5. After further discussion it had been agreed that the People's Initiative (Volksbegehren) should be made a test case. If the SED succeeded in obtaining the signatures of more than fifty percent of the electorate, then they could assert that they had the majority behind them. Should they, however, fail to do this the NDP would be licensed and [redacted] would receive the same favorable treatment from the Russians as the SED.

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Comment: The cool reception of the Volksbegehren among the German people makes it most unlikely that the SED could reach a figure of fifty percent.)

6. The party is now making every effort in the Russian Zone and Berlin to make the Volksbegehren a complete success. It has been decided that the collectors of signatures shall add in a number of false signatures, since it will be impossible to prove which are genuine and which are false. Collectors have been warned that they must not falsify the signatures of people who are well known to be anti-SED, but they have been instructed to use every possible threat to obtain signatures.

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